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Abstract This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a multicommod-
ity general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets.The standard concept
of competitive equilibrium is extended in order to allow for changes in inter-
temporal preferences. Depending on whether or not agents recognize that their
intertemporal preferences change, agents are called sophisticated or na¨ ıve. This
paper presents competitive equilibrium notions for economies with na¨ ıve agents
and economies with sophisticated agents and provides assumptions under which
both types of equilibria exist. Surprisingly, the set of na¨ ıve equilibria in societies
populated by time-consistent households is not allocationally equivalent to the
set of competitive equilibria. For sophisticated equilibria, the equivalence holds.
Time-inconsistency also raises conceptual issues about the appropriate concept of
efﬁciency. Choices have to be made concerning the incorporation of future pref-
erences and the appropriate instruments to create Pareto improvements. For both
na¨ ıve and sophisticated societies, we present four possible efﬁciency concepts.
Suitable conditions are speciﬁed for which both na¨ ıve and sophisticated equilibria
satisfy appropriate efﬁciency concepts.
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1 Introduction
Thevastmajorityoftheeconomicliteratureassumesthatpreferencesaretime-con-
sistent. With time-consistent preferences a decision concerning a future date can
be made at any period before that date and will not have to be reconsidered. Psy-
chological research, however, has suggested that observed behavior is often time-
inconsistent. Households frequently have intertemporal preferences that change
over time.An example is a phenomenon known as hyperbolic discounting.
Under discounted utility a consumption stream is evaluated by ﬁrst determin-
ing the value of consumption in each period and whether that consumption would
have taken place today, then multiplying each value by the discount factor cor-
responding to the period of consumption, and ﬁnally adding all these discounted
values. With exponential discounting the discount factor is given by δt, where δ
is a constant and t is the period of consumption. The hyperbolic discount function
is given by (1 + αt)−β/α, where α,β > 0 (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). The
quasi-hyperbolic discount factor is equal to 1 for t = 0 and to βδt for t>0, where
0 <δ<1 and 0 <β<1 (Phelps and Pollak 1968). Thus, under exponential
discounting the discount rate is constant, under quasi-hyperbolic discounting it is
highertodaythantomorrow,andconstantfromtomorrowon,andunderhyperbolic
discounting it is decreasing over time.
There is an extensive body of literature that claims that people tend to be more
patient in the long run than in the short run, i.e. that discounting is not exponen-
tial. If discounting is not exponential preferences can be time-inconsistent. While
a person may prefer one apple today to two apples tomorrow at any point in time,
he might prefer two apples eleven days from the current date to one apple ten days
from that date period. Hyperbolic discounting can explain this phenomenon while
maintaining the assumption of constant instantaneous preferences, but exponential
discounting cannot. For evidence of time-inconsistent behavior, we refer to Thaler
(1991), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Rachlin and
Raineri (1992), and Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a multicommodity gen-
eralequilibriumframeworkwithincompletemarkets.Wetakeageneralperspective




assume that at every period a household has two conﬂicting preferences.
The contribution of this paper, is on a conceptual level. The introduction of
time-inconsistent preferences in general equilibrium models requires a reformu-
lation of concepts and deﬁnitions of behavior, equilibrium, and efﬁciency. The
question of how to reformulate these concepts, is not trivial. It turns out that the
introduction of time-inconsistent preferences makes the analysis quite complex.
To alleviate the arising complications, and to highlight the conceptual issues, we
restrict the analysis to the simplest market structure we can think of. In particular,
we refrain from income transfers between periods.
We distinguish two types of societies, na¨ ıve and sophisticated. Na¨ ıve soci-
eties are populated by na¨ ıve households. These households do not realize that
their intertemporal preferences change over time. Sophisticated societies consistTime-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 593
of sophisticated households.A sophisticated household does realize that his inter-
temporal preferences will change in the future, and makes decisions today while
anticipating these changes. We introduce the notions of na¨ ıve and sophisticated
equilibriumasanextensionoftheusualnotionofcompetitiveequilibriumasapply-
ing to the time-consistent case. Surprisingly, the set of na¨ ıve equilibria of societies
populated by time-consistent households is not allocationally equivalent to the set
of competitive equilibria. For sophisticated equilibria, the equivalence holds. We
give appropriate conditions under which both types of equilibria exist.
When intertemporal preferences change over time, the very deﬁnition of efﬁ-
ciency has to be reconsidered. Choices have to be made concerning the incor-
poration of future preferences and the appropriate instruments to create Pareto
improvements. When efﬁciency is modeled as a program carried out by a social
planner with certain objectives and instruments, we make a distinction between
myopicandforward-lookingsocialplanners.Wealsodistinguishplannerswhocan
change both actual and planned consumption and planners who can only change
the former. For both na¨ ıve and sophisticated societies, this results in four possible
efﬁciency concepts.
Related work on time-inconsistency in a general equilibrium setting has been
done by Luttmer and Mariotti (2002, 2003), who study an inﬁnite-horizon one-
good model of an economy subject to uncertainty.Another related paper is the one
of Krusell et al. (2002), who study an inﬁnite horizon one-good model of a rep-
resentative-agent economy without uncertainty. We will show how the efﬁciency
concepts presented in those papers relate to our more general set-up.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The
deﬁnition and existence of competitive equilibria in na¨ ıve societies is the sub-
ject of Section 3. The deﬁnition of equilibrium and the proof of its existence for
sophisticated economies is analyzed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 introduce the
appropriateconceptsofconstrainedoptimality,anddiscusstheminrelationtona¨ ıve
and sophisticated economies. Section 5 considers myopic social planners, while
Section 6 considers forward-looking social planners. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Proofs are in theAppendix.
2 The model
Vector inequalities will be denoted by  ,> ,≥, ≤,< ,and   . We study a multi-
period multicommodity general equilibrium model with incomplete markets that
is not subject to uncertainty.There are T periods that are indexed by t ∈ T.In each
period, the exchange economy consists of H households, indexed by h ∈ H, and
L commodities, indexed by l ∈ L.1
Withrespecttoperiods,adistinctionshouldbemadebetweenaplanningperiod
and a consumption period. At planning period t,plans are made for consumption
in periods τ ≥ t.
At planning period 1, households expect to have a consumption set Xh
·|1 ⊂ RLT
fortheremainingT periods.Itisassumedthathouseholdshavecorrectexpectations
1 Notice that T indicates both the number of time periods, and the set of time periods. Simi-
larly, H (L) indicates both the number of households (commodities) and the set of households
(commodities). The context in which the symbol is used will make sure that no confusion can
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about their future consumption sets.This assumption implies that the consumption
setataplanningperiod t followsfromtheconsumptionplanrealizedsofarandthe
consumption set Xh




At every planning period t, households foresee an initial endowment eh
τ|t ∈ RL
for period τ. Here again, households are assumed to have correct expectations,
so eh
τ|t is independent of the planning period t. At planning period t, the vec-





At every planning period t, every household h makes a consumption plan,
which indicates how much it plans to consume in the current and future periods.
Forhouseholdhtheconsumptioninperiodτ,asanticipatedorplannedinperiodt,
is denoted by xh
τ|t ∈ RL. The planned consumption path for household h at period
t is denoted by xh
·|t = (xh
t|t,...,xh
T|t). For practical purposes some other notation
will be used: xh
−|t = (xh
1|1,...,xh
t−1|t−1) equals actual consumption up to period t,
xh
τ,τ |t = (xh
τ|t,...,xh
τ |t) is consumption planned at period t for the periods τ up
to τ , and xh = (xh
·|1,...,xh
·|T) denotes a consumption bundle, i.e. T consump-
tion paths, of household h. When we drop the superscript h, the H-tuple over all
households is taken, for instance x·|t = (x1
·|t,...,xH
·|t). Similarly, if we drop the
subscript t, the T-tuple over all time periods is considered, x = (x·|1,...,x ·|T).
For all the preceding vectors, a subscript l is added if attention is restricted to a
particular commodity l. We deﬁne the set Xh
−|t = R
L(t−1)




τ,τ |t,X h,X τ|t,X ·|t, and X are deﬁned by taking the appropriate projections







τ,τ |t = R
L(τ −τ+1)
+ ,X h = R
LT(T+1)/2
+ ,X ·|t =
 
h∈HXh
·|t, and X =
 
h∈HXh.
We call x ∈ X an allocation. Notice that x consists of T consumption paths
for the entire economy, each one starting at a different time period. Consumption
paths starting at different time periods are not necessarily consistent.We explicitly
allow for the possibility that xτ|t  = xτ|t . An allocation is called time-consistent if
at all periods the same consumption is planned for a given future period. This is
formally expressed by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 Time-consistent allocationAn allocation x is time-consistent if, for
every h ∈ H, for every t ∈ T we have xh
·|t = xh
t,T|1.











abuse of notation we will often write  xh




. When past consump-
tion is clear from the context, it is sometimes omitted from the notation, and the
2 Making the consumption sets depend on past consumption complicates the proofs of exis-
tence of equilibria. For instance, even when the endowments are in the interior of Xh
·|1, for certain
realized consumption plans, they might be on the boundary of the consumption set at a future
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preferencesofhouseholdhatplanningperiodt aredenotedby h,t .Thepreference
 h of household h is the collection of preferences at all possible planning periods,










and endowments: E = (Xh, h,e h)h∈H.
Consider two consumption paths that coincide up to period t  >t . Prefer-
ences of a household are said to be time-consistent if the household prefers one
consumption path over the other at period t  if and only if it does so at period t.
Deﬁnition 2 Time-consistent preferences Preferences of household h are time-







t,t −1|t = xh







·|t if and only if xh






Preferences are said to be time-inconsistent if they are not time-consistent.3
The following lemma shows that for the veriﬁcation of time-consistency of
preferences it sufﬁces to make only comparisons involving period 1 and period t.
The proofs of all lemmas and theorems are in the appendix.








·|1  h,1 xh







then the preferences of household h are time-consistent.
One of the implications of the lemma is that knowledge of the preference rela-
tion  h,1, together with the requirement of time-consistency, is sufﬁcient for the
derivation of all preference relations  h,t .
The consumption paths chosen by the households depend on current and ex-
pected future prices. In period t, the expected prices for period τ are denoted by
pτ|t ∈ Pτ|t = RL. As before, the vector of expected prices, at planning period
t, for present and future periods is denoted by p·|t = (pt|t,...,p T|t). The set of
admissible price systems P·|t is deﬁned accordingly. The expected prices, at plan-
ning period t, for periods τ up to τ  are denoted by pτ,τ |t = (pτ|t,...,p τ |t), and
the complete price system over all periods is represented by p = (p·|1,...,p ·|T),
where P is deﬁned appropriately. Finally, realized prices up to period t are repre-
sented by p−|t = (p1|1,...,p t−1|t−1).
We follow Pollak (1968), in distinguishing between na¨ ıve and sophisticated
households. Na¨ ıve households are not aware of their changing preferences. They
do not realize that in the future they might be willing to reconsider choices made
today. Thus, when making a consumption decision in planning period t,an a ¨ ıve
household h only takes into account the prevailing preferences at that particular
3 NotethatweallowforamoregeneralsetofpreferencesthanLaibson(1997,1998),Angeletos
et al. (2001) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2002, 2003), since we allow for preferences that are not
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period, xh
−|t.Sophisticatedhouseholds,ontheotherhand,areawareoftheirchang-
ing preferences and will take them into account when making current decisions.
They will only consider future plans that they expect to stick to. That is, when
planning future consumption in period t, they incorporate  xh
−|τ for all τ ≥ t.
First, the behavior of na¨ ıve households is addressed. Demand and supply of
commodities is identiﬁed and the existence of an equilibrium is established. An
example illustrates the intuition behind the model.The following assumptions will
be made throughout the paper:





Assumption 2 For every h ∈ H,t ∈ T,and xh
−|t ∈ Xh
−|t, the preference relation
 xh
−|t is complete, transitive, and continuous on Xh
·|t × Xh
·|t.
Assumption 3 For every h ∈ H,t ∈ T,and xh
−|t ∈ Xh
−|t, the preference relation
 xh






τ|t   xh
τ|t for




Assumption 4 For every h ∈ H,t ∈ T,and xh
−|t ∈ Xh
−|t, the preference relation
 xh







·|t we have αxh
·|t + (1 − α)xh
·|t  xh
−|t xh
·|t for all α ∈ (0,1).
Assumption 5 For every h ∈ H,eh
·|1   0.
A preference relation   is continuous on X × X if for all x ∈ X we have that
{y ∈ X : y   x} and {y ∈ X : y   x} are closed in X. The completeness, transi-
tivity and continuity assumptions on preferences ensure that there are continuous
utility functions uxh
−|t representing the preferences.
3N a ¨ ıve societies
Thissectionconsidersna¨ ıvehouseholds.Wetreatthemostsimpleincompletemar-
kets case, where links between periods result from intertemporal preferences only.
In planning period t, given a price vector p·|t, the na¨ ıve household will have to
make sure that in each future period the value of its consumption bundle in that
period does not exceed the value of its endowment. That is, the opportunity set of
the na¨ ıve household h at period t is deﬁned by
γ h




τ|t for all τ ≥ t}.




·|t ∈ γ h
t (p·|t) |˜ xh
·|t  xh
−|t xh
·|t for all xh
·|t ∈ γ h
t (p·|t)}.
In a standard competitive analysis, preferences are implicitly assumed to be time-
consistent. In our more general setting, one could deﬁne a competitive equilibrium
as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 Competitive equilibrium A pair (p∗
·|1,x∗
·|1) ∈ P·|1 × X·|1 is a com-













sense only if preferences are time-consistent. Another implicit assumption in the
deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium in the standard setting is that allocations are
time-consistent, as well as expectations of future prices. This observation leads to
the following concept of extended competitive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 5 Extended competitive equilibrium A pair (p∗,x∗) ∈ P × X is an
extended competitive equilibrium of the economy E if
(a) (p∗
·|1,x∗
·|1) is a competitive equilibrium,
(b) p∗
·|t = p∗
t,T|1 for every t ∈ T,and
(c) x∗h
·|t = x∗h
t,T|1 for every h ∈ H and every t ∈ T.
To deﬁne a competitive equilibrium that is appropriate for the study of economies
with time-inconsistent preferences, we ﬁrst assume that all households are na¨ ıve
and maximize their utilities given past consumption. Thus, at any given price sys-
tem, every household demands a future consumption path that is in its demand
set. The price system and demanded consumption bundles will constitute an equi-
librium if at any planning period, for every commodity, the total demand for that
commodity does not exceed the total endowment of that commodity. Since pref-
erences can be time-inconsistent, it may well be that the planned consumption
bundles and prices will not be equal to the actual consumption bundles and prices.
However, na¨ ıve households are not able to foresee their changing preferences and
the resulting changing consumption bundles and prices. Thus, at an equilibrium
pricesystemthereisnohouseholdthatwantstodeviateatanyperiodfromthecon-
sumption plan at that period, given the prices and price expectations at that period.
This leads to the following deﬁnition of an equilibrium for na¨ ıve households.
Deﬁnition 6 Na¨ ıve equilibrium A pair (p∗,x∗) ∈ P ×X is a na¨ ıve equilibrium












·|t for all t ∈ T.
The following theorem claims that the set of extended competitive equilibria
is a subset of the set of na¨ ıve equilibria if preferences are time-consistent.
Theorem 7 If preferences of all households are time-consistent, then an extended
competitive equilibrium of the economy E i san a ¨ ıve equilibrium.
The following example shows that the converse is not necessarily true. Even
if preferences of all households are time-consistent, a na¨ ıve equilibrium of the
economy might not be an extended competitive equilibrium. Notice that in a na¨ ıve
equilibrium all price expectations are correct and consistent with market clearing
in all periods. Our two-periods example is constructed in such a way that at the
beginning of the second period, two equilibrium continuations are possible. Since
preferences are time-consistent, one of these equilibrium continuations yields an
extended competitive equilibrium. The other equilibrium continuation, however,
turns out not to be consistent with any extended competitive equilibrium, but does
yield a na¨ ıve equilibrium.598 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
Example 8 Consider an economy with two na¨ ıve households, two goods and two
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Consider prices p∗ such that p∗
·|1 = (1,2,4,1) and p∗
·|2 = (3,4). Then for
household 1 we have min(x1
2,1|1,x1












is an optimal consumption bundle for household 2. By time-consistency of prefer-
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·|2, the second-period budget constraint for household 1 implies that
x1
2,2|2 = 4 − 3x1
2,1|2/4. The ﬁrst household then maximizes (x1
2,1|2 − 1)(x1
2,2|2 − 1)














































in the ﬁrst period subject to the budget constraint. By deriving the ﬁrst-order con-
ditionsofthatproblem,itcaneasilybeseenthathousehold1willdemandanequal
amount of both goods in the ﬁrst period only if p1,1|1 = p1,2|1. But then again, it
would demand 11
2 units of each good in the ﬁrst period, instead of 12
3 units. Thus,Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 599




2|2)) cannot be a
competitive equilibrium allocation. By similar arguments, p = (1,2,3,4) cannot
be a competitive equilibrium price system.    
Although a na¨ ıve equilibrium allocation might be incompatible with any ex-
tended competitive equilibrium, a weaker result can be obtained. If preferences
are time-consistent and a na¨ ıve equilibrium exists, then at least one of the na¨ ıve
equilibriaisanextendedcompetitiveequilibriumaswell.Thiscanbederivedfrom
the next theorem combined with Theorem 7.
Theorem 9 I fan a ¨ ıve equilibrium exists in the economy E, then also an extended
competitive equilibrium exists.
An a ¨ ıve equilibrium can be shown to exist under standard assumptions.
Theorem 10 [(Existenceofna¨ ıveequilibrium)]IftheeconomyE satisﬁesAssump-




and allocations as planned in the second period, and so on.
4 Sophisticated societies
This section considers sophisticated households. Again, we treat the most simple
incomplete markets case, where links between periods result from intertemporal
preferences only. The introduction of sophisticated households gives rise to new
phenomena. The difference between a na¨ ıve and a sophisticated household is that
the former is not aware of its changing preferences, whereas the latter is.A sophis-
ticated household will only make consumption plans for the future that it expects
to actually stick to. A sophisticated household can be seen as consisting of differ-
ent selves, where the ﬁrst self acts ﬁrst and the next selves act subsequently. The
behavior of the household can then be modeled as a game where the players are
the different selves. A sophisticated household will only play a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of that game.
In the last period, no plans for the future are made. Thus, in the last period,
the opportunity and demand sets of the sophisticated households resemble those























The opportunity sets in earlier periods are similar to those for the na¨ ıve house-
holds, except for the fact that the sophisticated household restricts itself to future600 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
consumption plans that are in his future demand sets at the expected future prices.














Since preferences depend on past consumption, the opportunity sets also depend















We introduce the following equilibrium concept for sophisticated societies.













·|t for all t ∈ T,
(c) p∗
t ,T|t = p∗
·|t  for all t,t  ∈ T with t ≤ t ,
(d) x∗h
t ,T|t = x∗h
·|t  for all t,t  ∈ T with t ≤ t .
As sophisticated households make plans that they will stick to in the future, we
followArrow (1953) and Radner (1972) and deﬁne an equilibrium price system in
such a way that expected prices are equal to actual prices, i.e. that households have
correctpointexpectationsaboutfutureprices.4 Furthermore,itisalsoassumedthat
consumption choices will not have to be reconsidered.
The next theorem presents a characterization of the notion of sophisticated
equilibrium.
Theorem 12 A pair (p∗,x∗) ∈ P × X is a sophisticated equilibrium if and only











·|1 for all h ∈ H,
(iii) p∗
·|t = p∗
t,T|1 for all t ∈ T,
(iv) x∗h
·|t = x∗h
t,T|1 for all h ∈ H and all t ∈ T.
Thenextresultshowsthatifpreferencesaretime-consistent,thenthesetofsophis-
ticated equilibria coincides with the set of extended competitive equilibria.
Theorem 13 Assume that the preferences of all households are time-consistent
and that Assumptions 1–2 hold. A pair (p∗,x∗) ∈ P ×X with p∗   0 is a sophis-
ticated equilibrium of the economy E if and only if it is an extended competitive
equilibrium.
4 See Dutta and Morris (1997) for alternatives to the concept of rational expectations as used
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We will establish the existence of a sophisticated equilibrium under some addi-
tional assumptions. Therefore, we ﬁrst deﬁne independence of past consumption.
Deﬁnition 14 Independence of past consumption Preferences are independent
of past consumption when  xh
−|t =  xh




The additional assumptions are as follows:
Assumption 4  For every h ∈ H,t ∈ T,and xh
−|t ∈ Xh










·|t  = xh
·|t we have αxh





Assumption 6 Preferences are independent of past consumption.
Assumption 6 does not allow for habit formation, where consumption depends
on consumption in the past. However, it does allow for intertemporal utility func-
tions that discount hyperbolically or quasi-hyperbolically.
Theorem 15 Existence of sophisticated equilibrium If the economy E satisﬁes
Assumptions 1–6 and 4 , then there exists a sophisticated equilibrium (p∗,x∗).
If Assumption 6 is not satisﬁed, it may well happen that an equilibrium does
not exist. In that case, it cannot be guaranteed that demand correspondences are
convex-valued. Then it is not difﬁcult to construct examples where no equilibrium
exists.
The existence proof is standard and can be found in the appendix. The major
complication to be taken care of is the part of the proof that shows a sophisticated
equilibriumofthecompactiﬁedeconomytoremainanequilibriumafterthebounds
on consumption sets have been removed.
5 Efﬁciency – the myopic case
When intertemporal preferences change over time, the very deﬁnition of efﬁciency
has to be reconsidered. Choices have to be made concerning the incorporation of
future preferences in the efﬁciency notion used and the appropriate instruments
allowed to create Pareto improvements. When efﬁciency is modeled as a program
carriedoutbyasocialplannerwithcertainobjectivesandinstruments,wecanmake
a distinction between myopic and forward-looking social planners. Myopic social
planners care only about the current self of every household. Forward-looking
social planners take all selves of every household into account. As far as instru-
mentsareconcerned,wedistinguishbetweensocialplannerswhocanmodifyboth
actual and planned consumption and social planners who can only change actual
consumption.Fortheformertypeofsocialplannerthereexistsana¨ ıveandasophis-
ticated version, where the latter version sticks to time-consistent allocations. We
will show that for the myopic case the latter distinction is immaterial.
This section considers social planners who care only about the current self of
each household. When a social planner takes into account only the intertemporal
preferencesofthehouseholdsinoneparticularperiod,thiscanmeanthatthesocial602 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
Table 1 Summary of efﬁciency concepts
Instruments
Current consumption Current and planned consumption
Na¨ ıve Sophisticated
societies societies
Myopic CMP MOP MOP
Goals Section 5.2 Section 5.1 Section 5.1
Forward- CP OP TCOP
looking Section 6.2 Section 6.1 Section 6.1
planner cares only about the selves corresponding to the period in which the plan-
ner is active and is myopic in that it forgets to realize that the preferences of future
selves might differ from the ones of current selves. Another interpretation is that
the social planner has reasons to believe that the preferences of the current selves
of the households are the true underlying preferences of the households and that
the preferences of the future selves of the households are distorted preferences.
5.1 Myopic overall pareto efﬁciency
In this subsection we assume that social planners are myopic and can alter both
actual and planned consumption. An allocation is called myopic overall Pareto
efﬁcient if there is no planning period t where actual and planned consumption
in that particular period could be reallocated in such a way that every household
would be at least as well off in that period as at the original allocation, whereas
one household would be strictly better off than at the original allocation.
Deﬁnition 16 Myopic overall pareto efﬁciency
The allocation x∗ is myopic overall Pareto (MOP) efﬁcient if there is no allo-









·|t   x∗h
−|t  x∗h
·|t  for all h ∈ H,and
(iii) ˜ xh 
·|t   x∗h 
−|t  x∗h 
·|t  for some h  ∈ H.
The intuition behind this deﬁnition is as follows. In every planning period t there
is a social planner who seeks to maximize only the preferences of the selves of
the households at period t.The social planner reallocates both current and planned
consumption. Now an equilibrium is called MOP efﬁcient if there is no sequence
of social planners that behave as described and that can make at least one house-
hold better off than in equilibrium, while not making any household worse off. If
preferences do not depend on past consumption this concept corresponds to “date-
t Pareto efﬁciency" for every t as introduced in Luttmer and Mariotti (2002). In
addition, a MOP efﬁcient allocation is renegotiation-proof in the sense of Luttmer
and Mariotti (2002).
MOP efﬁciency is closely related to unconstrained Pareto efﬁciency. In our
multi-period context, by restricting attention to the preferences of households at
period 1, Pareto efﬁciency could be deﬁned as follows.Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 603
Deﬁnition 17 Pareto efﬁciency The allocation x∗ is Pareto efﬁcient if there is no









·|1  h,1 x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H,and
(iii) ˜ xh 
·|1  h ,1 x∗h 
·|1 for some h  ∈ H.
Thefollowingtheoremshowsthatthetwoconceptsareequivalentwhenpreferences
are time-consistent and when attention is restricted to time-consistent allocations.
Theorem 18 Assume that preferences are time-consistent. Then a time-consistent
allocation is MOP efﬁcient if and only if it is Pareto efﬁcient.
In settings with incomplete markets, it has been shown that equilibria are typ-
ically not Pareto efﬁcient. Generically, they are not even efﬁcient when weaker
efﬁciency concepts are used.5 Therefore, since we have a sequence of markets that
do not allow for intertemporal income transfers, examples that show that na¨ ıve and
sophisticated equilibria may be MOP inefﬁcient can easily be found.
5.2 Constrained myopic periodical efﬁciency
In this subsection we assume that a social planner can only reallocate commodities
in the current period. This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 19 Constrained myopic periodical efﬁciencyThe feasible allocation
x∗ is constrained myopic periodically (CMP) efﬁcient if there is no allocation ˜ x
and no period t  such that
(i) ˜ xh
t +1,T|t  = x∗h









·|t   x∗h
−|t  x∗h
·|t  for all h ∈ H, and
(iv) ˜ xh 
·|t   x∗h 
−|t  x∗h 
·|t  for some h  ∈ H.
The following theorem says that CMP efﬁciency is weaker than MOP efﬁciency.
Its proof is obvious and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 20 If an allocation is MOP efﬁcient, then it is CMP efﬁcient.
An a ¨ ıve equilibrium allocation is CMP efﬁcient under the assumptions of the
foregoing sections.
Theorem 21 In an economy E that satisﬁesAssumptions 2, 3, and 4, a na¨ ıve equi-
librium allocation is CMP efﬁcient.
Asthenextexampleshows,asophisticatedequilibriumallocationisnotnecessarily
CMP efﬁcient underAssumptions 2, 3, and 4.
5 See for instance Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Citanna (1998) and Herings and
Polemarchakis (2005)604 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
Example 22 Consider an economy with two sophisticated households, two com-
































































Let the endowments be given by eh
t,l|1 = 1 for every good l, for every period t, and
for every household h.
Consider prices and allocation (p∗,x∗), where p∗
τ,l|t = 1 for every l ∈ L and
every t,τ ∈ T with t ≤ τ, x∗1
·|1 = (1,1,2,0), x∗2
·|1 = (1,1,0,2), x∗1
·|2 = (2,0), and
x∗2
·|2 = (0,2). It can easily be seen that the pair (p∗,x∗) constitutes a sophisticated
equilibrium.
However, consider the allocation ˜ x where ˜ x1
·|1 = (2,0,2,0), ˜ x2
·|1 = (0,2,0,2),
˜ x1
·|2 = (2,0), and ˜ x2
·|2 = (0,2). In the ﬁrst period both households are better off.
Therefore, the sophisticated equilibrium allocation x∗ is not CMP efﬁcient.    
By restricting the degree of time-inconsistency of preferences in such a way
that consumption decisions do not depend on past consumption, a sophisticated
equilibrium allocation is CMP efﬁcient. This is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 23 In an economy E that satisﬁes Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 6, a sophis-
ticated equilibrium allocation is CMP efﬁcient.
Krusell et al. (2002) consider similar concepts as the ones used in this section,
for economies with a representative consumer.
6 Efﬁciency: the forward-looking case
In this section we consider social planners that care about all selves.A social plan-
ner will reallocate consumption only if by doing so he can make one self of one
household better off, while not making any self of any household worse off. On the
one hand we might expect social planners to have more opportunities to improve
welfare now, in the sense that there are more selves to be made better off. On the
other hand, social planners have less opportunities to improve welfare since pref-
erences depend on past consumption. In the previous section, a social planner wasTime-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 605
myopic and therefore allowed to make future selves worse off, but here this is no
longer the case. Thus, there is no direct relationship between the concepts in this
section and the concepts in the previous section.
The modeling of forward-looking social planners requires an extension of the
preferencesofhouseholds.Areallocationofcommoditiesinperiodt affectshouse-
holdsinperiodst+1andfurther.Suchareallocationwillonlybemadeifnocurrent
or future self is made worse off. If we want to check whether future selves will be
worse off after the reallocation, we need households to be able to compare con-
sumption bundles with different realized past consumption. In this subsection we
willextendthepreferencesofahouseholdhinperiodt topreferenceswithdomain
Xh

















−|t. Notice that on top of comparing consumption
bundles with identical past consumption,  ∗h,t can also be used to compare con-
sumption bundles with different past consumption. The preferences relation  ∗
allows us to tell whether a household prefers a situation where it consumed four
apples yesterday and it consumes four apples today to a situation where it con-
sumed four pears yesterday and it consumes four pears today, which is impossible
with the preference relation   . For all properties of preference relations  xh
−|t
that we deﬁned in the ﬁrst part of this paper, we will say that  ∗h,t satisﬁes these
properties if the induced  xh
−|t satisfy them.
Some of our results require the following version of independence of prefer-
ences of past consumption.
Deﬁnition 24 Strong independence of past consumption Preferences  ∗h,t are





·|t) if and only if (xh
−|t,  xh
·|t)  ∗h,t (˘ xh
−|t,xh




We replaceAssumption 6 byAssumption 6 .
Assumption 6  Preferences  ∗h,t are strongly independent of past consumption.
This assumption is stronger than Assumption 6. Consider a household with pref-
















These preferences do satisfyAssumption 6, but notAssumption 6 .With these spe-
ciﬁc preferences past consumption does not inﬂuence current behavior, but past
consumption does inﬂuence current utility.
Wewillagainﬁrstconsidersocialplannersthatcanalterbothactualandplanned
consumption.606 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
6.1 Overall Pareto efﬁciency
Inthissubsectionweconsidersocialplannersthatcanalterbothcurrentandplanned
consumption. Combined with the assumption that social planners care about all
selves, the natural extension of the myopic overall Pareto efﬁciency concept yields
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 25 Overallpareto(OP)efﬁciencyThefeasibleallocationx∗ isoverall







·|t for all t ≥ t ,
(ii) (x∗h
−|t , ˜ xh
t |t ,...,˜ xh
t−1|t−1, ˜ xh
·|t)  ∗h,t (x∗h
−|t,x∗h
·|t ) for all h ∈ H and all t ≥ t  ,
and
(iii) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
t |t ,...,˜ xh 
t  −1|t  −1, ˜ xh 
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
(x∗h 
−|t  ,x∗h 
·|t  ) for some h  ∈ H and
some t   ≥ t .
A social planner will reallocate commodities only if by doing so one self of
one household is made better off and no self of any household is made worse off.
There is no need for a social planner to restrict himself to time-consistent alloca-
tions. This concept is therefore not appropriate for the analysis of sophisticated
societies. If preferences do not depend on past consumption, OP efﬁciency corre-
sponds to “weak Pareto efﬁciency” as discussed in Luttmer and Mariotti (2002).
OP efﬁciency is indeed a weakening of Pareto efﬁciency.
Theorem 26 Assume that preferences are time-consistent and satisfy Assumption
6 . If a time-consistent allocation is Pareto efﬁcient, then it is OP efﬁcient.
Note that a time-consistent OP efﬁcient allocation might not be Pareto efﬁ-
cient, even if preferences are time-consistent and satisfyAssumption 6 . Consider
for instance an economy with two households, where one household has a much
lowerdiscountfactorthantheother.Consideraninitialallocationwhereconsumers
have strictly positive endowments both in period 1 and in period 2. Then a social
planner who cares only about the selves in the ﬁrst period would let one household
consumeonlyintheﬁrstperiodandtheotheronlyinthesecondperiod.Ifthesocial
planner would also have to take care of future selves of the households, this would
notbepossible.Thehouseholdthatwouldnotconsumeinthesecondperiodwould
be better off in the ﬁrst period, but worse off in the second period. Examples that
show that na¨ ıve and sophisticated equilibrium allocations may not be OP efﬁcient
can easily be constructed.
In sophisticated societies, it makes sense to require a social planner to only
change allocations in such a way that the reallocation is time-consistent. This is
formalized in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 27 TC overall pareto (TCOP) efﬁciency The feasible time-consis-
tent allocation x∗ is time-consistent overall Pareto (TCOP) efﬁcient if there is no







·|t for all t ≥ t ,
(ii) (x∗h
−|t , ˜ xh
t |t ,...,˜ xh
t−1|t−1, ˜ xh
·|t)  ∗h,t (x∗h
−|t,x∗h
·|t ) for all h ∈ H and all t ≥ t  ,
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(iii) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
t |t ,...,˜ xh 
t  −1|t  −1, ˜ xh
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
(x∗h 
−|t  ,x∗h 
·|t  ) for some h  ∈ H and
some t   ≥ t .
In the case of myopic social planners we did not need to introduce a time-con-
sistent version of MOP efﬁciency, since those social planners do not care about
future selves.The following theorem provides a characterizationTCOP efﬁciency,
which is useful for later results. Its proof is obvious and therefore not included in
theAppendix.
Theorem 28 A feasible time-consistent allocation x∗ isTCOP efﬁcient if and only









−|t , ˜ xh
·|t )  ∗h,t x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H and all t ≥ t  , and
(iii) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
·|t )  ∗h ,t  
x∗h 
·|1 for some h  ∈ H and some t   ≥ t .
The following results shows that TCOP efﬁciency is a weakening of Pareto
efﬁciency.
Theorem 29 Assume that preferences are time-consistent and satisfy Assumption
6 . If a time-consistent allocation is Pareto efﬁcient then it is TCOP efﬁcient.
A similar argument as before shows that a TCOP efﬁcient allocation might be
Pareto inefﬁcient.
The following theorem claims that if preferences are independent of past con-
sumption, then a sophisticated equilibrium allocation is TCOP efﬁcient.
Theorem 30 In an economy E that satisﬁes Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 6’, a sophis-
ticated equilibrium allocation is TCOP efﬁcient.
6.2 Constrained periodical efﬁciency
In this section we assume that social planners care about all selves, but that a social
planner active in period t can only modify consumption in period t.This yields the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 31 Constrained periodical efﬁciency The feasible allocation x∗ is
constrained periodically (CP) efﬁcient if there is no other allocation ˜ x and no
period t  such that
(i) ˜ xh
t +1,T|t  = x∗h













·|t )  ∗h,t (x∗h
−|t,x∗h
·|t ) for all h ∈ H and
all t ≥ t  , and
(iv) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
t |t ,x∗h 
t +1|t +1,...,x∗h
t  −1|t  −1,x∗h
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
(x∗h 
−|t  ,x∗h 
·|t  ) for some h  ∈
H and some t   ≥ t .
As only current consumption can be changed, it is not necessary to introduce a
time-consistent variant of this deﬁnition as we did in the foregoing section. Con-
trarytotheconceptofTCOPefﬁciency,theCPefﬁciencyconceptisalsoapplicable
to na¨ ıve societies.608 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
Fig. 1. Na¨ ıve societies
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The following theorem says that the CP efﬁciency concept is weaker than the
OP efﬁciency concept. Since its proof is obvious, it is omitted.
Theorem 32 If an allocation is OP efﬁcient, then it is CP efﬁcient.
A similar theorem holds for time-consistent allocations and TCOP efﬁciency.
Theorem 33 If a time-consistent allocation is TCOP efﬁcient, then it is CP efﬁ-
cient.
Examples showing that under Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 6, na¨ ıve and sophisti-
cated equilibria need not be CP efﬁcient, can easily be found by letting the utility
level in the second period depend on ﬁrst-period consumption. If preferences are
strongly independent of the past, however, then na¨ ıve and sophisticated equilibria
are constrained periodically efﬁcient.
Theorem 34 In an economy E that satisﬁesAssumptions 2, 3, 4, and 6’, na¨ ıve and
sophisticated equilibrium allocations are CP efﬁcient.
TheresultsofthelasttwosectionsaresummarizedinFigures1and2.Anarrow
from “A" to “B" means that A implies B. Labels attached to arrows specify under
which assumptions the implications hold true.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, changing preferences are introduced in a multi-period general equi-
librium model with incomplete markets. Time-inconsistent preferences lead to the
developmentofnewconceptsofhouseholdbehavior,equilibrium,andefﬁciency.A
distinctionismadebetweenna¨ ıveandsophisticatedsocieties.Appropriateequilib-
rium notions are deﬁned. We extend the standard competitive equilibrium notion
and call it an extended competitive equilibrium. It is shown that, in the case of
time-consistent preferences, an extended competitive equilibrium is a na¨ ıve equi-
librium and a sophisticated equilibrium coincides with an extended competitive
equilibrium.An intriguing result is that with time-consistent preferences there can
bena¨ ıveequilibriumallocationsthatarenotcompatiblewithanycompetitiveequi-
librium. For na¨ ıve societies an equilibrium is shown to exist under quite general
conditions. For sophisticated societies the existence of an equilibrium can only
be established when certain assumptions on the degree of time-inconsistency are
made.
Several efﬁciency criteria are introduced. A distinction is made between efﬁ-
ciency concepts that take into account only the preferences of the current selves
and concepts that take into account the preferences of both the current and future
selves. Moreover, we distinguish the cases where only current consumption can be
altered to make Pareto improvements and cases where both current and planned
consumption can be changed. Suppose only current consumption can be altered.
Then we provide sufﬁcient conditions for both na¨ ıve and sophisticated equilibria
to be efﬁcient. Suppose both current and planned consumption can be changed.
Then na¨ ıve equilibria are typically not efﬁcient. If future selves are not taken into
account,thensophisticatedequilibriaarenotefﬁcienteither.Forsophisticatedequi-
libria we provide sufﬁcient conditions for efﬁciency when future selves are taken
into account.610 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3 Let xh
−|t ∈ Xh
































·|t)  h,1 (xh
−|t,xh
·|t).
The “only if" part of the hypothesis yields
xh






















is similar.    
Proof of Theorem 7 Suppose(p∗,x∗)isanextendedcompetitiveequilibrium.Since
x∗h
τ|t = x∗h







seen that (b) of Deﬁnition 6 is satisﬁed. It remains to be shown that Condition (a)
of that deﬁnition is satisﬁed.
Notice that if x∗h
·|1 ∈ γ h
1 (p∗
·|1), then x∗h
t,T|1 ∈ γ h
t (p∗
t,T|1). Moreover, for every
xh
·|t ∈ γ h
t (p∗
t,T|1) there is xh











·|1 ∈ γ h
1 (p∗
·|1) and x∗h
·|1  h,1 xh
·|1 for all
xh
·|1 ∈ γ h
1 (p∗


















extended competitive equilibrium is a na¨ ıve equilibrium.    
Proof of Theorem 9 This follows immediately from the deﬁnitions.    Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 611
Proof of Theorem 10 We follow the approach of Debreu (1959) compounded with
an induction argument.







   







τ,l|t + ε for all l ∈ L
 
.
Let   γ h
t and  δh
t denote the corresponding budget and demand correspondences.The
economy   E isthecompactiﬁedeconomy.Wederivesomepropertiesofthedemand
correspondence  δh.
We denote the (L − 1)-dimensional unit simplex by  , so   ={ p ∈ RL
+ |
 L
l=1 pl = 1}, and we denote the k-fold Cartesian product of   by  k. The price
vectors are restricted to the sets   P·|t =  T−t+1.
In the next lemma the box product in p·|t δh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t) is deﬁned by taking for
all τ ≥ t the product of pτ|t and any demand xh




−|t) ={ (wt,...,w T) ∈ RT−t+1 |
there is an xh
·|t ∈ δh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t) such that wτ = pτ|txh
τ|t,τ ∈ t,...,T}.
   
Lemma 35 Assume that the economy E satisﬁes Assumptions 1–5. Consider a
na¨ ıve household h ∈ H, a planning period t ∈ T,and a realized consumption
plan xh
−|t ∈   Xh
−|t. Then, at prices p·|t ∈   P·|t,   δh
t (·,xh
−|t) is a non-empty, compact
and convex-valued, upper-hemi continuous correspondence that satisﬁes:





2. Homogeneity property,   δh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t) =   δh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t), where for τ  ≥ t, for
λ>0,pτ |t = λpτ |t and pτ|t = pτ|t for τ  = τ .
Proof (i) Since eh
·|t ∈   γ h
t (p·|t), we know that   γ h
t (p·|t) is non-empty.











m=1 be such that xh
·|t
m ∈   γ h
t (p·|t




·|t. By closedness of   Xh







·|t ∈   γ h
t (p·|t).Since  γ h







m=1 be a sequence of prices with p·|t
m → p·|t. Let xh
















τ|t for m larger than a certain
value M1. In that case deﬁne xh
τ|t
m = xh
τ|t for m>M 1. Otherwise, if pτ|txh
τ|t =
pτ|teh
τ|t > 0, it holds that pτ|t
meh
τ|t > 0 and pτ|t
mxh
τ|t > 0 for m larger than a
certain M2.N o w ,i faτm > 1, then deﬁne xh
τ|t
m = xh




τ|t for m larger than M2. Note that in this case aτm is unique and




τ|t > 0.612 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
For all m smaller than or equal to M1 or M2 deﬁne xh
·|t
m arbitrarily such that
xh
·|t





m ∈   γ h
t (p·|t
m) for every m and xh
·|t
m → xh
·|t. Thus,   γ h
t is lower-hemi
continuous. It follows that   γ h
t is continuous.
We can then apply the Theorem of the Maximum to establish that   δh
t (·,xh
−|t)
is non-empty, compact-valued and upper-hemi continuous. Convex-valuedness of
  δh
t is straightforward. Walras’ law follows from monotonicity. The homogeneity
property follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the budget constraints   γ h
t .    
Proof of Theorem 10 (continued) Deﬁne   Z·|t =
 





any x−|t ∈   X−|t,
  ζt(p·|t,x −|t) =
 






dence   ζt(·,x −|t) is non-empty, compact-valued, convex-valued and upper-hemi
continuous on   P·|t.
Deﬁne
μt(z·|t) ={˜ p·|t ∈   P·|t |˜ pτ|tzτ|t ≥ pτ|tzτ|t for all p·|t ∈   P·|t for all τ ≥ t}.
By the theorem of the maximum, μt is non-empty and upper-hemi continuous.
Moreover, μt is convex-valued. For x−|t ∈   X−|t, deﬁne φt(·,x −|t) :   Pt ×   Zt →
  Pt ×   Zt as φt(p·|t,z ·|t,x −|t) = μt(z·|t) ×  ζt(p·|t,x −|t).
First, consider period 1. By Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem φ1(·) h a saﬁ x e d
point (p∗
·|1,z·|1) ∈ μ1(z·|1) ×  ζ·|1(p∗
·|t).
Since then p∗
τ|1zτ|1 ≤ 0 for every τ, we know, by the deﬁnition of μ1, that
z·|1 ≤ 0. The corresponding consumption bundles are denoted by xh
·|1 ∈  δh
1(p∗
·|1).
By Walras’ law (Lemma 35), we know that p∗
τ,l|1 = 0i fzτ,l|1 < 0. By mono-
tonicity, the excess supply of good l for period τ can be given to any household
without making that household worse off and without violating the budget con-
straints. Thus, given prices p∗
·|1, z∗
·|1 = 0 ∈   ζ1(p∗
·|1). Denote the corresponding
demands by x∗h
·|1.
It remains to be shown that x∗h
·|1 ∈ δh
1(p∗
·|1) for every h. Suppose that this is not
the case, i.e. suppose that there is a household h with x∗h













for every τ, and every l, there would be a small positive number λ ∈ (0,1) such
that λ˜ xh
·|1 + (1 − λ)x∗h
·|1 ∈   γ h
1 (p∗
·|1), and λ˜ xh
·|1 + (1 − λ)x∗h
·|1  h,1 x∗h
·|1, which would
contradict x∗h





·|1) for every h.
Now suppose that for every τ ≤ t there exist p∗
·|τ such that 0 ∈ ζτ(p∗
·|τ,x∗
−|τ).
Then, by a similar argument as before it can be shown that there exists a p∗
·|t+1
such that 0 ∈ ζt+1(p∗
·|t+1,x∗
−|t+1). This argument of induction then establishes the
existence of a na¨ ıve equilibrium.    
Proof of Theorem 12 It can immediately be seen that a sophisticated equilibrium
pair (p∗,x∗) satisﬁes (i)–(iv). It remains to be shown that a pair that satisﬁes
(i)–(iv) is a sophisticated equilibrium. Let (p∗,x∗) satisfy (i)–(iv) and let t<t  .
Then, by (iii) p∗
·|t = p∗
t,T|1 and p∗
·|t  = p∗
t ,T|1.S op∗
t ,T|t = p∗




·|t  = x∗
t ,T|1.S ox∗
t ,T|t = x∗
·|t  and (d) isTime-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 613




























1|1). Now, by an argument of




−|t) for all t. So (a) is satisﬁed too.
Thus, a pair (p∗,x∗) that satisﬁes (i)–(iv) is a sophisticated equilibrium.    




·|1) we know that x∗h
·|1  h,1 xh


































1,τ−1|1) for every τ>t . Suppose that x∗h




there must be a consumption bundle that is strictly preferred to x∗h
t,T|1, but is in
the opportunity set at time t, which, by time-consistency, leads to a contradiction
of x∗h
·|1 being an optimal consumption bundle for household h in period 1. Thus,
(p∗,x∗) is a sophisticated equilibrium.
Now let (p∗,x∗) be a sophisticated equilibrium. Suppose that (p∗,x∗) is not
an extended competitive equilibrium. Then there must be a household h and an
  xh
·|1 ∈ Xh
·|1 such that  xh





τ|1 for every τ. Consider the
maximumofthose  xh
·|1 withrespectto h,1.Suchan  xh
·|1 existsbecausepreferences
are continuous. Since   xh
·|1 is not chosen by h, there must be a t1 > 1 such that
  xh
t1,T|1 / ∈ ξh
t1(p∗
t1,T|1,  xh
1,t1−1|1). So there must be a t 




















τ|1 for every τ ≥ t 
1, and by time-con-




1)  h,1   xh
·|1  h,1 x∗h
·|1, which contradicts our assumption on
  xh
·|1.    
Proof of Theorem 15 We will now prove the existence of sophisticated equilibria.
ThenextlemmastatesthatAssumptions1–6and4  sufﬁcetoobtainconvex-valued
demandofsophisticatedhouseholds.Inparticular,itisshownthatdemandiseither
empty or single-valued. The ﬁrst step is again to compactify the consumption sets
and examine the compactiﬁed economy   E.
Lemma 36 AssumethattheeconomyE satisﬁesAssumptions1–6and4 .Consider
a sophisticated household h ∈ H, a planning period t ∈ T,and a realized con-
sumption plan xh
−|t ∈ Xh
−|t. Then, at prices p·|t ∈ P·|t, ξh
t (·,xh
−|t) is convex-valued
and either empty or single-valued.
Proof Since preferences are independent on past consumption, the demand corre-













t|t)}614 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
will be convex-valued.Then it is straightforward that the demand correspondences
are convex-valued.
Suppose that a demand correspondence contains two elements. By convex-
valuedness of the demand correspondence and by strict convexity of preferences
this yields a contradiction. Thus, the demand correspondence is either empty or
single-valued.    
The next lemma shows that demand in the compactiﬁed economy satisﬁes
standard properties needed to show existence.
Lemma 37 Assume that the economy E satisﬁes Assumptions 1–6, and 4 . Then,
at prices p·|t ∈   P·|t,  ξh
t is a non-empty, compact-valued and continuous function
that satisﬁes for every h ∈ H, t ∈ T:





2. Homogeneity property,   ξh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t) =   ξh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t), where for τ  ≥ t, for
λ>0,pτ |t = λpτ |t and pτ|t = pτ|t for τ  = τ .
Proof The homogeneity property is straightforward.
Since in the last period the maximization problem for the sophisticated house-




−|T, the characteristics of   ξh
T follow immediately from Lemma 35.
By single-valuedness and upper-hemi continuity, continuity of  ξh
T follows imme-
diately. We will establish the properties of the other demand correspondences by
an argument of backwards induction.
Let t ∈ T. Assume that  ξh
τ is non-empty, compact-valued and continuous for
τ ∈ T, τ ≥ t + 1. We need to show that   ξh
t is non-empty, compact-valued and
upper-hemicontinuous.Thus,itisnecessarytoshowthat  φh
t satisﬁestheconditions
needed to apply the theorem of the maximum.
(i) Since   ξh
t+1(p·|t+1,xh
−|t,eh





τ|1,τ≥ t + 1 for xh
t+1,T|t =   ξh
t+1(p·|t+1,xh
−|t,e h





t|1)) ∈   φh
t (p·|t,xh




(ii) Consider the sequence {p·|t
m}∞
m=1 with p·|t



























every τ ≥ t and xh
t+1,T|t






m). By continuity it
follows that pτ|txh
τ|t ≤ pτ|teh
τ|t for every τ ≥ t. Moreover, by continuity
of   ξh
t+1, xh




·|t ∈   φh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t).
Thus, the graph of   φh
t is closed.
By boundedness of   Xh
·|t it can easily be seen, for a compact set B, that   φh
t (B)
is bounded. Therefore,   φh
t is upper-hemi continuous.Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 615










·|t ∈   φh
t (p·|t,xh
−|t).
Then, for m large enough, there are xh
t|t
m ∈   Xh









































·|t. Thus,   φh
t (·) is lower-hemi continuous.
Since   φh
t is both upper-hemi and lower-hemi continuous, it is continuous.
To conclude,   φh
t satisﬁes the conditions needed to apply the theorem of the
maximum.Also, since Walras’law holds for period t + 1, and since consumption
in period t does not inﬂuence the optimal consumption in period t +1,Walras’law
holds for period t. The characteristics of  ξh
t then follow immediately.    
Proof of Theorem 15 (continued) Note that in order to prove the existence of a
sophisticated equilibrium, we can restrict ourselves to the ﬁrst planning period. By
similar arguments as in the foregoing section, there exists a restricted equilibrium
pair (p∗
·|1,z ∗
·|1) such that z∗
·|1 ∈   ζ1(p∗
·|1) and z∗
·|1 ≤ 0. By monotonicity and strict
convexity of preferences, it must be the case that p∗
·|1   0. Therefore, and byWal-
ras’law, it must hold that z∗











Then, since consumption in period 1 does not inﬂuence optimal consumption in
period 2, a similar argument as in the proof ofTheorem 10 leads to a contradiction.
Now assume that x∗h
2,T|1 / ∈ ξh
2(p∗
2,T|1,x∗h





which again leads to a contradiction, or x∗h




this way, we end up with x∗h
T|1 / ∈ ξh
T(p∗
T|1x∗h
1,T−1|1), which leads to a contraction by
the same arguments as before. Thus, a sophisticated equilibrium exists.    
Proof of Theorem 18 Letthetime-consistentallocationx∗ beParetoefﬁcient.Sup-









·|t   x∗h
−|t  x∗h
·|t  for all h ∈ H,and
(iii) ˜ xh 
·|t   x∗h 
−|t  x∗h 
·|t  for some h  ∈ H.
But then, by time-consistency of preferences we have
(x∗h
−|t , ˜ xh
·|t )  h,1 (x∗h
−|t ,x∗h
·|t )
for all h ∈ H, and (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
·|t )  h ,1 (x∗h 
−|t ,x∗h 
·|t  ) for some h  ∈ H. Then it fol-
lows from time-consistency of x∗ that (x∗h
−|t , ˜ xh
·|t )  h,1 x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H, and
(x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
·|t )  h ,1 x∗h 
·|1 for some h  ∈ H. This yields a contradiction to x∗ being
Pareto efﬁcient.
That a MOP efﬁcient allocation is Pareto efﬁcient, follows immediately from
the deﬁnitions.    616 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
Proof of Theorem 21 Let (p∗,x∗) b ean a ¨ ıve equilibrium. Suppose that x∗ is not
CMP efﬁcient, i.e. that there is a reallocation ˜ x and a period t  that satisfy
(i) ˜ xh
t +1,T|t  = x∗h









·|t   x∗h
−|t  x∗h
·|t  for all h ∈ H, and
(iv) ˜ xh 
·|t   x∗h 
−|t  x∗h 
·|t  for some h  ∈ H.
Then, since ˜ xh
·|t  was not chosen in equilibrium, we must have
p∗
t |t  ˜ xh 
t |t  >p ∗
t |t x∗h 
t |t ,and
p∗
t |t  ˜ xh
t |t  ≥ p∗
t |t x∗h
t |t  for every household h ∈ H.




t |t  ˜ xh































Thus, it follows that the na¨ ıve equilibrium allocation x∗ must be CMP efﬁcient.    
Proof of Theorem 23 Let (p∗,x∗) be a sophisticated equilibrium. Suppose that x∗
isnotCMPefﬁcient.Thentheremustbeareallocation ˜ x andaperiodt  thatsatisfy
(i) ˜ xh
t +1,T|t  = x∗h









·|t   x∗h
−|t  x∗h
·|t  for all h ∈ H, and
(iv) ˜ xh 
·|t   x∗h 
−|t  x∗h 
·|t  for some h  ∈ H.
Since preferences are independent of consumption in the past, optimal con-
sumption is also not dependent on consumption in the past. Similarly, optimal
futureconsumptionisindependentofcurrentandpastconsumption.Therefore,the
only reason why household h  has not chosen ˜ xh 
·|t  is that its period-t  component
must be too expensive. Similarly, for every household h the period-t  component
of ˜ xh
·|t  must be at least as expensive as the period-t  component of x∗h
·|t . This can be
summarized as
p∗
t |t  ˜ xh 
t |t  >p ∗
t |t x∗h 
t |t ,and
p∗
t |t  ˜ xh
t |t  ≥ p∗
t |t x∗h
t |t  for every household h ∈ H.
As in the proof of Theorem 21 this leads to a contradiction. It follows that the
sophisticated equilibrium allocation x∗ must be CMP efﬁcient.    Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model 617
Proof of Theorem 26 Let x∗ be a time-consistent allocation that is Pareto efﬁcient.
Supposethatx∗ isnotOPefﬁcient.Thentheremustbeanallocation ˜ x andaperiod







·|t for all t ≥ t ,
(ii) (x∗h
−|t , ˜ xh
t |t ,...,˜ xh
t−1|t−1, ˜ xh
·|t)  ∗h,t (x∗h
−|t,x∗h
·|t ) = x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H and all
t ≥ t  , and
(iii) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
t |t ,...,˜ xh 
t  −1|t  −1, ˜ xh 
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
(x∗h 
−|t  ,x∗h 
·|t  ) = x∗h 
·|1 for some h  ∈ H
and some t   ≥ t .
Then, byAssumption 6 ,w eh a v e
(ii) (x∗h
−|t, ˜ xh
·|t)  ∗h,t x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H and all t ≥ t  , and
(iii) (x∗h 
−|t  , ˜ xh 
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
x∗h 
·|1 for some h  ∈ H and some t   ≥ t .
By time-consistency of preferences it then follows that
(ii) (x∗h
−|t  , ˜ xh
·|t  )  ∗h,1 x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H, and
(iii) (x∗h 
−|t  , ˜ xh 





−|t  , ˜ xh
·|t  ) = eh
·|1 by deﬁnition of x∗, this would imply that x∗ is not
Pareto efﬁcient, which is a contradiction. Thus, x∗ must be OP efﬁcient.    
Proof of Theorem 29 Letthetime-consistentallocationx∗beParetoefﬁcient.Then
it follows by Theorem 26 that x∗ is OP efﬁcient. By the deﬁnitions it then follows
immediately that x∗ is TCOP efﬁcient.    
Proof of Theorem 30 Let (p∗,x∗) be a sophisticated equilibrium. Suppose that x∗
is not TCOP efﬁcient. Then, there must be a time-consistent reallocation ˜ x and a









−|t , ˜ xh
·|t )  ∗h,t x∗h
·|1 for all h ∈ H and all t ≥ t  , and
(iii) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
·|t )  ∗h ,t  
x∗h 
·|1 for some h  ∈ H and some t   ≥ t .









T|t  ≥ p∗
T|1x∗h
T|1 for every household h ∈ H,
whichyieldsacontradictionasbefore.Nowassumethatforeveryhouseholdhand
every ˜ t>twe have
p∗
˜ t|1˜ xh
˜ t|t  ≤ p∗
˜ t|1x∗h
˜ t|1 , and
(x∗h
−|t , ˜ xh
·|t )  ∗h,˜ t x∗h
·|1.
Since preferences are independent of past consumption it follows that ˜ xh
·|˜ t must be
an optimal consumption in period ˜ t given prices p∗
˜ t,T|1. Now assume that t   = t.
Then we must have
p∗
t|1˜ xh 





t|t  ≥ p∗
t|1x∗h
t|1 for every household h ∈ H,618 P.J.J. Herings and K.I.M. Rohde
which again leads to a contradiction. Continuing like this we end up with this
contradiction for t = t , so that case (iii) can never hold.
It follows that the sophisticated equilibrium allocation x∗ must be TCOP efﬁ-
cient.    
Proof of Theorem 33 Letthetime-consistentallocationx∗ beTCOPefﬁcient.Sup-
pose that x∗ is not CP efﬁcient. Then there is an allocation ˜ x and a period t  such
that
(i) ˜ xh
t +1,T|t  = x∗h
t +1,T|t  = x∗h













·|t )  ∗h,t (x∗h
−|t,x∗h
·|t ) for all h ∈ H and
all t ≥ t  , and
(iv) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
t |t ,x∗h 
t +1|t +1,...,x∗h
t  −1|t  −1,x∗h
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
(x∗h 
−|t  ,x∗h 
·|t  ) for some h  ∈
H and some t   ≥ t ,
which contradicts the fact that x∗ is TCOP efﬁcient.    
Proof of Theorem 34 For sophisticated equilibria the result follows directly from
Theorems 33 and 30, since sophisticated equilibrium allocations are time-consis-
tent. Now let (p∗,x∗) b ean a ¨ ıve equilibrium. Suppose that x∗ is not CP efﬁcient.
Then there must be a reallocation ˜ x and a period t  that satisfy
(i) ˜ xh
t +1,T|t  = x∗h













·|t )  ∗h,t (x∗h
−|t,x∗h
·|t ) for all h ∈ H and
all t ≥ t  , and
(iv) (x∗h 
−|t , ˜ xh 
t |t ,x∗h 
t +1|t +1,...,x∗h
t  −1|t  −1,x∗h
·|t  )  ∗h ,t  
(x∗h 
−|t  ,x∗h 
·|t  ) for some h  ∈
H and some t   ≥ t .
Since preferences are independent of past consumption, t   = t . Since ˜ xh 
t |t  was
not demanded in equilibrium by household h  in period t  , it must hold that
p∗
t |t  ˜ xh 
t |t  >p ∗
t |t x∗h 
t |t ,and
p∗
t |t  ˜ xh
t |t  ≥ p∗
t |t x∗h
t |t  for every household h ∈ H,
which leads to a contradiction as before. Thus, x∗ must be CP efﬁcient.    
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